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From February to February  
and From Ru ba Ru to Rastokhez: 
Political Mobilisation in Late Soviet Tajikistan 
(1989-1990)1
Isaac scarborougH*
On February 24, 1989 a large group of young men gathered on the square 
in front of the Supreme Soviet (Verkhovnyj Sovet) building in Dushanbe, 
Tajikistan. They carried banners calling for a law that would make Tajik the 
official state language in the Republic; they declaimed the need to “revive 
Tajikistan’s ancient culture”; they refused to listen to the police’s requests 
that they leave the square (TadžikTA, 1989)2. Estimates vary on the size 
of the crowd, but the total number of students, teachers, and others gathe-
red on the square was most likely no greater than one thousand (Ganelin, 
1989). For Tajikistan, however, which had for decades been quite justifiably 
considered one of the calmest and quietest corners of the ussr, this un- 
sanctioned gathering was both unexpected and unsettling. Never before in 
the memory of the Tajik ssr’s leaders had an organised group appeared 
1 The author would like to express his thanks to Šokhrat Kadyrov and Olga Brusina, who 
provided comments on earlier versions of this article, as well as to the two anonymous 
reviewers.
2 TadžikTA was a wire service in Soviet Dushanbe to which many local newspaper articles 
were attributed.
* Isaac Scarborough is a PhD candidate in the Department of International History at the 
London School of Economics and Political Science (lse). His dissertation research is 
focused on the implementation of perestroika-era political and economic reforms in the 
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Isaac Scarborough144
on the street, without government sanction, to make political claims and 
demands. In fact, the demonstration held in February 1989 was most likely 
the first independently organised political event in Dushanbe in more than 
fifty years: the whole of the post-war period in the republic had been mar-
ked by unremitting quietude and acceptance of the political order.3
Needless to say, the republic’s political and party leaders were taken by 
surprise. A request to hold a meeting had been registered on February 21, 
but given the legal requirement that meetings be registered at least one 
week in advance, the request was declined and little further attention was 
apparently given to the question. On February 24, many of the republic’s 
leaders were at work in the Supreme Soviet building, discussing possible 
approaches to developing Tajik as the republic’s state language – a fact that 
only highlighted the organised and explicitly political nature of the mee-
ting held in plain sight of the gathered politicians. For a lack of any esta-
blished procedure in such circumstances, Tajikistan’s political leaders took 
a risky step: they went outside to speak with the crowd. Led by Goibnazar 
Pallaev, the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Tajik ssr, a group of 
government deputies spent around two hours speaking with those gathered 
on the square. By the early evening the protest had ended, the crowd was 
quietly dispersed, and the political leadership went back to their business 
of developing a new law on the republic’s state language, now, at least 
nominally, with the demands of the crowd in mind.
Causes for Mobilisation 
Questions remained, however, about how to respond to these demands – 
as well as who exactly was making them. The majority of the crowd that had 
gathered on February 24 was made up of university students and teachers, as 
3 According to data collated by the kgb in 1988, over the preceding forty years only one 
major “disorder” (besporâdok) had been recorded in the Tajik ssr, which involved a 
large group of Tajik young men fighting with those of Slavic origin in 1985 (Spravka ot 
Predsedatelâ kgb Čebrikova M.S. Gorbačevu ot 4.3.1988. aprF, F. 3, Op. 108, D. 523, 
L. 27-34. Reprinted in Istočnik: vestnik arkhiva prezidenta Rossijskoj Federacii, 19(6), 
1995, 152). In the data published in support of his 2002 Nationalist Mobilization and the 
Collapse of the Soviet State, Mark Beissinger has identified one further “protest” event as 
occurring in December 1987 in Dushanbe. Upon review of his cited source, however (Fbis, 
1989), it seems clear that the supposed event was little more than a group of students having 
an “agitated” discussion about the 1985 fight. For Beissinger’s collated data, see “Mass 
Demonstrations and Mass Violent Events in the Former ussr, 1987-1992,” available via 
http://www.princeton.edu/~mbeissin/research1.htm#Data.
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well as some journalists and members of the Tajik “intelligentsia.” Available 
reports on the meeting fail to identify any clear leaders, noting instead the 
generally disorganised nature of the meeting and the open dialogue that 
emerged with Pallaev and the other government representatives. Although in 
later publications and interviews certain individuals – many of whom would 
go on to become actively involved in Tajik politics – identified themselves 
as the meetings’ organisers, for the Tajik government in 1989 there seemed 
no clear organisation or group with which to hold negotiations.4 The over- 
whelming picture that emerged was one of undirected and angry young 
people who had grown politically aware over the years of perestroika and 
now found themselves without an outlet for their frustration and energy.
This picture also fit well with the overall development of perestroika 
that the republic’s leaders had been observing for the past four years. After 
Mikhail Gorbachev’s declaration in 1985 that the ussr needed to reform 
and the subsequent implementation across the Union of the complicated 
and often self-contradictory reforms that came to be known as “perestroi-
ka,” the Tajik ssr found itself in a complicated political and economic 
position. On the one hand, many of perestroika’s political and social 
reforms, which had been developed in and for a Moscow-based context, 
had little immediate impact in Tajikistan. Ligachev’s infamous anti-alcohol 
campaign met with little opposition in the Tajik SSR (TadžikTA, 1987); the 
lightening of censorship controls changed little in the publication practices 
of Tajik newspapers; the “democratisation” of party and factory elections 
had little effect on the ground in Tajikistan, where besides the Party there 
were literally no other organisational structures;5 given its largely agricul-
tural economy, even the reforms meant to “speed up” production, increase 
labour productivity, and implement the self-financing of enterprises had 
at best limited effect on the lives and livelihoods of Tajik Soviet citizens.6
4 Based on what information is available from contemporary press sources and later 
interviews, it seems clear that amongst the organisers of the February 1989 meeting were 
Mirbobo Mirrahimov, Abdunaby Sattorov (Sattorzoda) and other future founders of the 
organisation “Rastokhez.”
5 By early 1990, for example, Communist Party leaders in Tajikistan were beginning to note 
the difference between their own single-candidate elections and the more “democratic” 
elections starting to take hold elsewhere in the ussr. See for example CC member Tagaev’s 
comments at a February 1990 Tajik Central Committee Plenum (Šabdolov, 1990, p. 23).
6 Labour productivity was actually falling in the agricultural sector in Tajikistan through the 
1980s and growing at one of the lowest rates in the Union in the industrial sector over the 
same period (Orazmuradov & Zûzin, 1987, p. 28).
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On the other hand, however, the aggregate effect of perestroika’s reforms 
had by 1988 and 1989 begun to seriously disrupt the Tajik economy. Reforms 
to the structure and operations of Soviet enterprises enacted in 1987 led to 
a breakdown in the production and delivery of industrial goods to the Tajik 
ssr, which from year to year brought greater and greater slowdowns and 
losses on the Tajik side. As the Chairman of the Tajik Council of Ministers 
Izotullo Haëev and his deputy Georgij Košlakov frequently complained to 
the Council of Ministers of the ussr, by 1989 literally thousands of these 
orders were simply not being delivered.7 The “speeding up” (uskorenie) of 
the Soviet economy and attempts to increase labour productivity led to the 
firing8 of millions of workers across the ussr as managers were exhorted 
to “do more with less.” In the European parts of the ussr where this and 
other reforms were designed, endemic labour shortages at least during the 
first years of perestroika meant that these workers were quickly hired by 
other enterprises. In Tajikistan, however, where unemployment had been 
growing for decades and even before perestroika had reached double-digit 
levels, the reforms only increased the ranks of the unemployed.9 Although 
cooperatives’ impact on the Tajik economy remained limited, they had by 
1989 begun to act, much as across the whole of the ussr, as an indirect 
cause of inflation – not to mention as a convenient funnel for managers and 
enterprise directors to corruptly embezzle state funds. Rumours abounded 
about the involvement of leading Communist Party officials in the opera-
tions of larger cooperatives, while on the ground most people only saw a 
newfound abundance of expensive šašlik stands.10 
7 Undelivered goods included lumber, tractors, machine equipment, and many others 
(garF, F. 5446, Op. 150, D. 276, L. 25, 106-107, 129). The first secretary of the Kurgan-
Tûbe Oblast Committee of the Tajik Communist Party, I. Khalimov, also noted in 1990 
that his oblast was obligated to import “more than 6,000 different indispensable products,” 
failures in the delivery of which had led to “chronic deficits” across the oblast (rgani, F. 1, 
Op. 10, D. 96, L. 31).
8 In the Soviet press and government documents this process was exclusively referred to as 
the “freeing up” (osvoboždenie or vysvoboždenie) of labour resources.
9 From 1987 to 1990 the official unemployment rate in Tajikistan rose from 26 to 30% 
(rgaspi, F. 17, Op. 160, D. 1672, L. 3). This rise was attributed across the board to 
perestroika-era reforms, and even the State Labour Committee in Moscow admitted that 
as early as 1987 the “freeing up” of workers had “caused problems employment in regions 
with superfluous labour supplies (trudoizbytočnye raiony) (garF, F. 5446, Op. 162, D. 153, 
L. 122-123).
10 For a discussion of the issues and concerns raised by early cooperatives in Dushanbe, 
see: Anonymous, 1988a; Demidov, 1990. Former employees of the Tajik Gosplan have 
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The economic changes on display in 1989 would have been both confu-
sing and quite disturbing to the average citizen of the Tajik ssr. Inflation 
was on the rise at the same time as the deficit of basic goods; unemploy-
ment was increasing and the average wage was decreasing, notwithstanding 
increases to some (primarily managerial) positions.11 As a result of delivery 
issues faced by Tajik enterprises, housing construction had fallen even fur-
ther behind schedule in Dushanbe and around the republic. At the same 
time, there would have seemed little immediate cause or justification for 
this downturn: although the central press and television declared the “peres-
troika” of society and its newfound “openness” (glasnost), on the ground in 
Tajikistan political and social life remained almost unchanged. Newspaper 
editors, such as Khodžaev of Komsomoli Todžikiston, were still fired for 
not toeing the party line; the republican government continued to go out of 
its way to highlight the dangers of Islam and religion; the leadership of the 
Tajik Communist Party never failed to emphasise its dedication to the esta-
blished socialist order. The republican economy was slowly collapsing – 
and by 1989 officially in recession12 – and yet on the ground in Tajikistan 
there seemed no obvious social or political justification for this.
This confusing and contradictory economic collapse was the backdrop 
to the February 1989 protest in Dushanbe, and remained a central part of 
daily life in the republic throughout the remaining years of perestroika. 
Inevitably, the deterioration of economic conditions in the Tajik ssr would 
come to play an important role in the processes of political mobilisation 
incipient in Dushanbe, even as the main claims voiced on the square in 
February 1989 focused on the Tajik language, culture, and process of 
“national” development. Economic degradation was deeply intertwined 
with localised feelings of injustice, imbalanced development, and linguis-
tic imperialism: it is no historical accident that the latter arguments came to 
the fore at the exact point at which the Tajik ssr found its previously stable 
economy move towards decline and ultimate collapse. Understanding the 
process of Tajik political mobilisation that began for all intents and purpo-
also mentioned similar concerns from the period (Karimov, 2015, p. 350; also the author’s 
interview with Rahmat Ûsupovič Khakulov, Dushanbe, February 2015).
11 The frequent imbalance between worker and manager salaries was commonly cited in the 
Tajik press (Umarov, 1988; Anonymous, 1987; Kletzkin, 1987).
12 The Council of Ministers of the Tajik ssr reported a 0.4% drop in overall production for 
1989 (garF, F. 5446, Op. 162, D. 260, L. 16-18).
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ses in February 1989 requires a detailed analysis of both the background 
processes in the republic as well the organisations that came to fill the 
demands for mobilisation.
While post-Soviet scholarship has analysed the political organisa-
tions that developed after 1989 in Tajikistan, little focus has been paid 
to the underlying political and economic conditions in the republic, nor 
to the details of these organisations’ development. Attention has gene-
rally focused on the nationalist discourse of these organisations (Collins, 
2006; Akbarzadeh, 1996; Markowitz, 2009), as well as their links to the 
“National Fronts” of the Baltic republics and the broader trends of glasnost 
and nationalism sweeping the ussr at the time (Atkin, 1997; Rubin, 1998; 
Dudoignon, 1998). This has aligned well with a broader literature on mobi-
lisation and Soviet collapse that has emphasised Tajikistan’s place at the 
ebb of a “tidal wave” of mobilisation moving across the ussr (Beissinger, 
2002; Snyder, 1998). Although there is no doubt about the influence of 
outside actors and movements on the leaders of the political organisations 
developing in Dushanbe in 1989, this focus has tended to ignore the mobi-
lised in favour of the mobilisers. The discourse of cultural imperialism and 
linguistic dominance may have been both linked to broader political trends 
and used to some efficacy in the Tajik capital, but the question remains as to 
why it was effective at mobilising Dushanbe’s residents. By systematically 
tracking the history of the Tajik ssr’s first effective political organisers 
over the course of February 1989 to February 1990, this article aims to fill 
this need in the literature for a “dense narrative” of the period – one that 
will elucidate both the weight of the organisations that developed and the 
economic contradictions in which they were able to mobilise.
An Outlet for Social Frustration
For its part, the Tajik leadership was well aware of these contradictions 
in 1989: for it had years been struggling with increasing unemployment 
and lowered opportunities for young people – including university gra-
duates – in the republic. Perestroika had served to extenuate many of the 
economic problems faced by the Tajik ssr, and for the heads of the Tajik 
Communist Party and Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic, there would have 
been little doubt about how these problems had led, slowly but surely, to 
the outburst of undirected frustration – such as it was seen – on the square 
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in February 1989. It was this reasoning that led the republican leadership, 
after the crowd had dispersed and emotions had calmed, to decide to pro-
perly redirect the anger and frustration they had observed: they would 
found a platform for discussion where such complaints could be voiced 
safely and constructively.13
The republican leadership delegated the development of this platform 
to the Tajik Komsomol, which began to conduct negotiations in March 
1989 with the meeting organisers.14 By April an agreement was struck, and 
the political club “Ru ba Ru” (“face-to-face” in Tajik) was founded as a 
legal entity under the Central Committee of the Tajik Komsomol.15 It was 
agreed that Ru ba Ru meetings would be held once or twice a month in the 
House of Political Enlightenment (Dom političeskogo prosveŝeniâ), which 
the republican Komsomol provided for these purposes (Davlat, 2015b). 
As the Tajik republican leadership had envisioned, Ru ba Ru was orga-
nised as a forum in which citizens could meet with the Tajik ssr’s leaders 
and express constructive criticism about their work. Local and republican 
leaders were invited to its meetings with the intention of developing a 
mutually valuable exchange of ideas and opinions: the party and republi-
can leadership would learn about the issues bothering Tajik Soviet citizens, 
and the citizens would have an opportunity to interact directly with those 
in charge of the local economy and political sphere. Over the course of 
the summer and fall of 1989 a number of meetings were held between 
Komsomol members, university students, and young academics together 
with leading political and social figures in Dushanbe. Among those figures 
invited were Džamšed Karimov, the First Secretary of the Dushanbe City 
Committee of the Tajik Communist Party, members of the Tajik ssr’ dele-
13 This initiative, it should also be said, was very much in line with the then official party 
position on growing incidents of “informal” organisations and demonstrations amongst 
young people. As I.M. Il’inskij, the director of the Komsomol Higher School’s Scientific 
Research Centre under the Central Committee of the Soviet Komsomol, put it in 1987, 
the main cause of informal movements’ growth was society’s failure to deal with young 
people’s “real problems.” The only solution, he argued, was to engage in dialogue with the 
“searching, unruly, spiny, contradictory, inconvenient young people” (Il’inskij, 1987, p. 94).
14 According to some commentators, the Komsomol had also been waiting for an opportunity 
to develop such a platform, having grown tired of waiting for informal groups to develop it 
on their own (Alimov & Saidov, 1991, pp. 84-85).
15 The concept of a “political club” predated Ru ba Ru; other organisations in Dushanbe 
had over the years formed such clubs for internal discussions and the dissemination of 
information. For a description of Ru ba Ru’s legal status, see: Anonymous, 1989d.
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gation to the Congress of People’s Deputies of the ussr, the editors of 
the newspaper Večernij Dušanbe, and others (Kurbonien, 1989; Abašin & 
Buškov, 1998, p. 29).
From the very beginning, however, the Tajik Republican Leadership’s 
attempts to redirect the energy of the February crowd towards “construc-
tive” criticism proved difficult to implement. Quite the opposite, in fact – it 
quickly became clear that Ru ba Ru was in many ways an uncontrollable 
political forum. During an early meeting of the club in July 1989, for 
example, the political leadership of Tajikistan, including Tajik Communist 
Party First Secretary Kahhor Mahkamov, Council of Ministers Chairman 
Izotullo Haëev and others were extensively harangued for the state of the 
Tajik economy and the government’s failure to do anything about unem-
ployment (Davlat, 2015c). Later meetings continued in this pattern, with 
government figures facing constant criticism for ecological, political, and 
cultural issues. As one observer put it, “In practice, at all of the meetings 
and discussions held with representatives of the leadership, the conversation 
followed one and the same pattern – proving that the invited leader had made 
only mistakes and blunders in his work” (Alimov & Saidov, 1991, p. 85). By 
and large, moreover, the government figures invited to Ru ba Ru meetings 
proved either unable or unwilling to answer the flood of criticism they faced, 
leaving the room red-faced and angry. “Tajikistan’s ministers and bureaucrats 
came to the club “Ru ba Ru” with fat and full stomachs,” one leading partici-
pant later wrote approvingly, “but left with sweaty faces, bowed with shame 
and disgrace” (Mirrahim, 1998, p. 78). Yet the emphasis on criticism came 
not only from the club’s participants, but also from its Komsomol organisers, 
many of which had also been participants in the February 1989 meeting. One 
such organiser and Komsomol secretary was Džumakhon Isoev, who had 
been designated by the Komsomol Central Committee as responsible for Ru 
ba Ru’s organisation and operations. In a September 1989 interview with 
the newspaper Komsomolec Tadžikistana, Isoev highlighted the critical and 
oppositional tone of the political club, going as far as to accuse the republican 
leadership of “lying” and “covering up” facts about the lives of young people 
in Tajikistan (Anonymous, 1989b).
The critical tone taken by Ru ba Ru clearly found support in the Tajik 
ssr: while not the first “informal” organisation to be founded in the Tajik 
ssr during perestroika, Ru ba Ru quickly outstripped its predecessors 
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and competitors. Earlier groups had been formed in 1988, but they had 
remained largely unknown outside of a small circle, and had been limited 
in their scope and focus. In late 1988, for example, a small group of intel-
lectuals including the well-known poet Bozor Sobir had founded a group 
called “Ëvaroni bossozi” (Helpers of perestroika), but the group’s activities 
remained generally unclear (Crow, 1990, p. 20). Other groups, including 
the Khujand-based “Èhëi Khudžand” or “Dirafši koviën” from Nurek, pro-
moted goals similar to Ru ba Ru’s (dialogue and political democratisation), 
but failed to gain the same political weight and broad support enjoyed by 
the latter (Davlat, 2015a; Usmonov, 2003, pp. 19-22). Other small groups 
continued to proliferate over the course of 1989, but most accounts of the 
period agree that Ru ba Ru retained its position as the most important poli-
tical platform in the republic.16
Not only Ru ba Ru as an organisation, moreover, but over the summer of 
1989 certain Ru ba Ru participants also began to gain notoriety in Dushanbe 
and elsewhere for the content of their political criticism. For the most part 
these were politically active university teachers and journalists – indivi-
duals who had been involved in both the organisation of the February 1989 
meeting and had begun by August-September to agitate in relation to the 
upcoming February 1990 elections to the Tajik Supreme Soviet (Abašin & 
Buškov, 1998, p. 31). From what evidence is available, these individuals 
do not yet appear to have gained a great deal of popularity or influence 
amongst the population at large, but both the political leaders of the republic 
and the most politically active subsection of the younger generation seem 
to have noted their role by the fall of 1989. The most attention was paid 
to the philosopher Mirbobo Mirrahimov (Mirboboi Mirrahim), who was 
labelled an “extremist” by the kgb and considered an “idol” by a number of 
Ru ba Ru participants.17 Mirrahimov had gained fame as early as 1988 as a 
defender of Tajik cultural values, and had published articles advocating for 
increased use of the Tajik language (and even the pre-Soviet Persian script), 
including his famous “To ba kai ob az tagi âkh meravad” (“How long will 
16 This has also been confirmed in conversation with former Ru ba Ru participants (author’s 
interview with Abdullo Gafurov, Dushanbe, February 2015).
17 Interviews with former Ru ba Ru participants in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, February 2015. 
For its part, the republican kgb was particularly displeased by calls made by Ru ba Ru 
participants to voters to vote on national grounds and only for “Tajik” candidates (Press 
gruppa kgb tssr, 1989).
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water flow under the ice?”).18 In addition to having been amongst the first 
to raise issues of Tajikistan’s cultural development in the popular press, 
Mirrahimov gained in notoriety when it was also claimed in Dushanbe that 
the decision to fire the editor of Komsomoli Todžikiston, A. Khodžaev, had 
been connected to the latter’s agreeing to publish Mirrahimov’s articles.19 
One way or another, although Ru ba Ru continued to hold meetings and 
harangue politicians until January 1990 (Davlat, 2015e), by the end of the 
summer of 1989 it was clear that the political club had come to be dominated 
by Mirrahimov and a group of like-minded journalists, writers and acade-
mics. Soon, moreover, this group would outgrow the confines of the politi-
cal club in which it had developed and become the founding membership of 
Tajikistan’s first independent political movement, Rastokhez.
Building a Political Platform
Officially founded on September 14, 1989, the national movement 
Rastokhez (“rebirth” in Tajik) called upon the leadership of the Tajik ssr to 
assist in the revival of the Tajik nation, including through the promotion of 
Tajik language, culture, and traditions (Davlat, 2015d). Its founders, who 
included in addition to Mirrahimov the economist Tohir Abdudžabborov 
(Abdudžabbor), journalist Akhmadšo Komilov (Komilzoda), professors 
Haifabobo Hamidov and Šarofiddin Imomov, and poet M. Kanoatov, publi-
shed an official Programme and began to lobby the republican government 
for change.20 In many ways Rastokhez’s Programme aligned with the 
18 Mirrahimov’s article (1988) created a great deal of controversy both upon its publication 
and in recent years. For an early (negative) response, see: Ûsupov, 1988. More recently, 
arguments have arisen about whether or not Mirrahimov was the first to raise such concerns, 
with authors such as Mirzorakhmatov (2011, p. 41) claiming that other writers, for example 
the more established philosopher Akbar Tursunov, had already published about the need 
to promote Tajik language and culture. As Mirzorakhmatov admits, however, any such 
publications were “academic” and read “only by a very few in the republic.” Mirrahim 
(2011), moreover, has argued that Mirzorakhmatov is “lying” and that no such articles 
existed prior to his own.
19 In part, Khodžaev was accused in February 1988 of allowing articles that “made sweeping 
accusations against perceived opponents in the republic and elsewhere about their disdain 
for Tajik history and culture, lowering the significance of the Tajik nation, and so forth.” 
This was very similar to the content of Mirrahimov’s articles from earlier in the year 
(Anonymous, 1988b).
20 Rastokhez does not appear to have ever kept an official count of its members, and accounts 
of who, exactly, led the movement can differ significantly depending on who is recounting 
events. Standard figures include Mirbobo Mirrahimov and Tohir Abdudžabborov; other 
individuals, including Abdunaby Sattorov (Sattorzoda) or Askar Hakim are also frequently 
153From February to February and from Ru ba Ru to Rastokhez
broader calls for economic development and political reform espoused by 
Gorbachev and others in Moscow: it advocated greater independence for 
local enterprises, cited the broader “economic and political crisis” faced by 
Soviet society, and noted with approval that “Perestroika… has been called 
upon to provide for the rebirth of all nations, including the Tajik nation” 
(Programma, 1990, p. 115).
Yet Rastokhez’s Programme also went further than the central Soviet 
government may have approved of, advocating for a broad recalculation 
of republics’ “national product” (nacional’nyj dokhod) and the ways that 
funds were allocated from local coffers to the federal Soviet budget. In part, 
Rastokhez argued for fully removing the Soviet receipt tax (nalog s obo-
rota), which had been long used to partially balance the costs to the Soviet 
budget of subsidising foodstuffs and other goods (ibid., p. 123). Together, 
these two steps were reflective of a broader debate in Tajikistan about 
the role of the local economy in the broader Soviet system.21 As per the 
established calculation of republican national product, the value allocated 
to each Soviet republic was based upon the retail price (in Soviet rubles) 
paid for the total production of that republic. In the case of Tajikistan, 
where the economy was dominated by the production of cotton and other 
raw goods, this meant only the total amount paid to Tajik enterprises by 
other Soviet enterprises that purchased the raw cotton for sale on the world 
market or the production of finished goods in the ussr. Tajikistan’s final 
“national product” did not include any percentage of the export price of 
cotton grown in the republic nor the final value of the clothes produced 
with its cotton – only the much lower value provided for the raw material. 
In addition, receipt taxes, which were added to the cost of consumer goods, 
were also calculated based on the cost of the final product – and any tax 
revenues from the receipt tax left on the local level were provided to the 
region where the final product was produced. These policies, along with 
(but not always) mentioned. For diverging accounts, see: Šodiev & Khumajro, 2014; 
Mirrahim, 1998.
21 This debate preceded perestroika but gained in urgency as the Soviet economy began to 
unravel during the final years of the ussr. Arguments continued throughout about the total 
value of agricultural goods (primarily cotton) grown in Tajikistan and sold on the world 
market by the ussr and their comparative value against the total amount of finished goods 
sent to Tajikistan from elsewhere in the ussr. For a selection of the arguments made in 
this vein about Tajikistan and Central Asia, see: Mukomel’, 1989; Nišanov, 2012, p. 246; 
Kalinovsky, 2014.
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the centralised collection of taxes and redistribution to the republics, had 
long undervalued the contribution of the Tajik ssr to the Soviet budget, 
overemphasised its “subsidised” nature, and lowered access to social and 
economic development funds.22 From the perspective of a number of Tajik 
economists, including Abdudžabborov, the Tajik economy had long been 
left without its fair share of resources as a result of polices that underva-
lued raw goods in favour of finished products and left Tajik agricultural 
workers underpaid and with little choice but to pay more for the goods that 
were brought into Tajikistan from elsewhere.23
Beyond economic reforms, moreover, Rastokhez began to hint at cer-
tain nationalist tendencies in its Programme and other public statements. 
Its official Charter called for a certain level of Tajik independence, arguing 
that “The Tajik ssr should be a sovereign state and should independently 
resolve issues related to the political, economic, social, and cultural deve-
lopment of the republic.” In addition to calls to promote the use of the 
Tajik language in the public sphere, Rastokhez also advocated to end the 
“overwhelming migration of people to Tajikistan” from outside the repu-
blic, which was taken as a threat to the republic’s independence and natio-
nal values (Ustav, 1990, p. 133; Programma, 1990, p. 129).24 Language, 
22 The Soviet State Statistics Committee calculated that for 1989 the state had spent 
900 million rubles in the Tajik ssr above the amount of the national product produced 
in the republic, thus making Tajikistan one of the ussr’s more “subsidised” regions. At 
the same time, however, the Committee admitted that “as a result of the particularities of 
price formation in the productive spheres, notable significance is rendered on the relation 
between produced and spent national incomes by the placement of extraction or processing 
activities for material or energy and fuel goods, along with the production of final products, 
on the territory of one or another republic (…) a notable gap exists between prices on the 
world market and the internal bulk prices used for the same goods during inter-republican 
exchanges (for fuels and raw goods they are lower than worldwide prices, while for 
consumer goods they are higher).” Thus the debate about recalculating figures of national 
product had by 1989 reached the highest echelons of the ussr (garF, F. 5446, Op. 162, 
D. 176, L. 27-29).
23 Tajik workers, like most in the Soviet agricultural sector, were underpaid in comparison 
to the average industrial or service-sector Soviet worker. Analyses of Soviet wages from 
the late 1980s consistently fixed average Tajik salaries (agricultural or otherwise) at 
approximately 82% of the Soviet average (Lyčagina & Čamkin, 1989, p. 14; Morozova, 
1989, p. 76).
24 It might be noted that migration to Tajikistan by non-Tajiks was hardly a significant 
issue in the late 1980s – in fact, non-Tajik Soviet citizens had been leaving Tajikistan for 
years. This had led to a drop in the number of skilled workers in the republic and was 
considered in both Moscow and Dushanbe to be a serious threat to the republic’s economic 
development (Umarov & Matkupov, 1989; Narzikulov, 1991).
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however, remained one of Rastokhez’s central issues, and it returned again 
and again to the need to replace the Soviet Tajik Cyrillic alphabet with 
the classical Persian script, to establish Tajik as the state language of the 
Tajik ssr, and to return the language to its previous status as a language of 
literature, culture, and government. While the Tajik language had remained 
well established in rural areas and the majority of the Tajik population was 
fluent in no language other than Tajik,25 Dushanbe had over the decades 
developed into a Russian-speaking city, and one in which the majority of 
daily life and interactions with the government occurred primarily, if not 
exclusively, in Russian (Kalinovsky, 2014; Alimov & Saidov, 1991, p. 39). 
This was the gap that Rastokhez’s founders targeted over the summer of 
1989, for which they were rewarded in July 1989 with the passage by 
the Supreme Soviet of the Tajik ssr of the Law “On Language,” which 
enshrined Tajik as the republic’s state language.
Following the passage of the Tajik Law on Language, Rastokhez conti-
nued to use all accessible means to lobby the republican government for 
further change. Although its attempt to register as a “public organisation” 
(obŝestvennaâ organizaciâ) was essentially ignored, it continued to hold 
small-scale protests and appeal to the Tajik Supreme Soviet on issues of 
cultural, economic, and political independence.26 Its representatives conti-
nued to publish widely in the Tajik language press, including in the news-
paper Adabiët va San”at, which was the official organ of the Tajik Writers’ 
Union. This newspaper quickly became dominated by Rastokhez acolytes 
and made marked gains during 1989. By the end of the year it had reached 
83,000 subscribers, a more than two-fold increase since 1986; its subscriber 
base would reach 100,000 by 1990.27 Thanks to the efforts of Rastokhez 
members, moreover, the Tajik Union of Journalists was also granted its 
own newspaper, Sukhan, the first issue of which was published in February 
1990 under the editorship of Mirrahimov (Hammer, 1998, p. 45). Later in 
1990, moreover, Mirrahimov and others in Rastokhez would also go on to 
found and edit two independent papers, Rastokhez and Dunië.
25 Survey data from 1986-1987 showed that only 28-29% of Tajik citizens could claim 
fluency in Russian (Kalandarov, 1989, p. 112; Ermolaeva, 1987, pp. 98-99).
26 Information about Rastokhez’s activities during the latter part of 1989 is limited, but 
the journalist Oleg Panfilov (1996) has reported such meetings during the final months 
of the year.
27 rgaspi, F. 17, Op. 155, D. 2180, L. 14; F. 17, Op. 159, D. 1706, L. 40.
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By the end of 1989 Rastokhez had well established itself within the 
small world of political parties in Dushanbe. Other than the Communist 
Party of the Tajik ssr, in fact, it was then the only significant political 
force: other “movements” and “public organisations” had been founded 
over the course of 1988 and 1989, but none gathered the same support 
or mobilised the same number of followers as Rastokhez. In December 
1989, moreover, a number of smaller organisations, including “Èhëi 
Khudžand,” “Vakhdat” (from Ura-Tûbe), and the Kulâb-based “Oškoro” 
joined the Rastokhez platform, thus essentially becoming part of the larger 
organisation (Sultanov, 2014, p. 117). Finally, by early 1990 Ru ba Ru had 
essentially run its course, and was unofficially shut down, ironically not 
that long after it was first officially recognised by the political leadership of 
the republic in September and October (Anonymous, 1989c). Other poli-
tical parties had yet to be founded – the Tajik Democratic Party and Tajik 
branch of the Islamic Rebirth Party would only come together in 199028 – 
and as the year came to a close, Rastokhez would have presented itself as 
the lone opposition movement in the republic of any significance. It was 
from this position, moreover, that the movement had begun to campaign 
for the February 1990 elections to the Tajik Supreme Soviet.
February 1990
While elections to the Tajik Supreme Soviet were held as planned in 
February 1990, they were overshadowed by a week of protests, looting, 
and violence that struck Dushanbe on February 11-18. Initially set off by 
rumours attesting to the arrival of thousands of Armenian refugees from 
Baku (where ethnic pogroms against the Armenian population had occur-
red in January 1990) and the provision of scarce housing by the state to 
these refugees, the originally peaceful protest of February 11 quickly turned 
violent. Shots were fired on February 12 by troops guarding the Central 
Committee building in Dushanbe, and by February 14, more than twenty 
civilians had been killed, thousands of stores and businesses looted by 
marauding packs of rioters, and the Tajik leadership seemed paralyzed by 
28 The modern Party of the Islamic Rebirth of Tajikistan claims that it was founded in 
1973 by a group of mullahs who gathered surreptitiously until the late 1980s. In terms of 
formal party structures, however, the Islamic Rebirth Party of the ussr was first founded in 
Astrakhan in June 1990, with the Tajik branch of the party holding its foundational congress 
on October 8, 1990 in the village of Chortut outside of Dushanbe (Tolz, 1990).
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inaction.29 Taking advantage of the government’s paralysis, the thousands- 
strong crowd, which had for days refused to leave the square in front of the 
Central Committee of the Tajik Communist Party’s headquarters, elected 
a “Committee of 17” to negotiate with the authorities; many members of 
the committee were Rastokhez founders and acolytes.30 On the evening 
of February 14, the First Secretary of the Communist Party of Tajikistan, 
Mahkamov, the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Tajikistan, Pallaev, 
and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Haëev, agreed in negotia-
tions with the “Committee of 17” to quit their posts and hand power in 
the republic over the Committee. Although the leadership’s resignation 
was announced late that night on republican television and printed in at 
least one newspaper the next morning, Mahkamov, Pallaev, and Haëev 
later refused to officially resign during an extended unscheduled meeting 
of the Communist Party of Tajikistan held on February 15-16. Their hand 
had been strengthened by the arrival of additional internal troops on the 
morning of the 15th, and although protests and meetings continued through 
February 18, order was slowly established in the city and the leadership 
retained their positions.
The events of February 11-18, 1990 became controversial immediately 
after they were over; accounts of the week vary radically depending on 
the source. This includes both those responsible for the civilian deaths that 
occurred during the first days of unrest, the sequence of events leading up 
to and following the Tajik leadership’s partial resignation on February 14, 
and those involved in organising the initial protests that grew out of hand. 
At the time, Rastokhez was blamed by the Tajik party and government 
leadership as one of the meeting organisers, something that its founders 
29 The events of February 11-18, 1990 have been described very differently by various 
parties. For a selection of viewpoints and descriptions, see Šabdolov, 1990; Helsinki Watch, 
1991; as well as the Soobŝenie Komissii prezidiuma Verkhovnogo Soveta Tadžikskoj ssr 
po proverke sobytij 12-14 fevralâ 1990 g. v g. Dušanbe, as held in the personal archive of 
Buri Karimov, Moscow, Russian Federation. Today, these events remain so controversial 
that in conversation no one in Dushanbe will admit to having even been present on the 
square during this week, further complicating the task of verifying events and their ordering 
(author’s interviews with former Rastokhez members and journalists, Dushanbe, 2015).
30 Of the committee members, at least seven can be identified as Rastokhez founders or close 
associates, including: Bozor Sobir, Askar Khakim, Tohir Abdudžabborov, Kh. Khomidov, 
Mirbobo Mirrahimov, and A. Kholikov (Protokoli masvaratii bainitarafaini rohbariâti 
džumkhuri va sozmoni mardumi az 14.2.1990, as held in the personal Archive of Buri 
Karimov, Moscow, Russian Federation).
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both then and now deny.31 For its part, Rastokhez and the members of 
the “Committee of 17” accused the Soviet and Tajik security services of 
starting the meeting and arming the criminals who roamed the city for 
days committing crimes and looting (for supporting accounts see Mâlo & 
Gončarov, 1990; Ganelin, 1990; Davlatov & Mamadšoev, 2012). Today 
these remain the standard narratives of the events, and are largely repeated 
wholescale in most contemporary accounts.
No matter the content or outcome of the February events, however, the 
week of violence in February 1990 can in many ways be seen as the apogee 
of Rastokhez’s political influence and mobilisation. Although the move-
ment went to great efforts to deny its involvement in the protests’ organi-
sation – going as far as to send a note to Mahkamov on February 12 back-
dated to February 9 claiming that “they had no relationship” to the events 
in the city32 – there is a great deal of evidence showing their involvement 
from the very first days. Rastokhez members were both identified amongst 
the politicians giving speeches to the crowd on February 11 (Karimov, 
2015, 94), and were very active in the “Committee of 17.” Some of its 
members even went as far as to write letters to the Congress of People’s 
Deputies in Moscow explaining the situation in Dushanbe and signing off 
as members of this committee.33 While it remains difficult to determine 
to what degree they were involved in the organisation of the protests, the 
members of Rastokhez at the very least quickly took advantage of their 
standing with the population to organise the crowd and place themselves at 
the front of its politicisation.
Following the collapse of the “Committee of 17’s” attempt to affect 
political change in the republic and the protests’ end, however, Rastokhez 
began to fade as a political movement. Accused of organising what had 
become a week of violence in the capital, many of its members began to 
find themselves pressured by the authorities. While the movement officially 
continued to exist through 1992, its activities during 1990 and 1991 were 
relatively limited beyond lobbying the Tajik ssr to pass a declaration of 
sovereignty in the fall of 1990. Other political parties, including the Tajik 
31 For the government’s position at the time, see: rgaspi, F. 17, Op. 159, D. 1710, L. 16-17. 
Comparable accounts can also be found in Ponomarov, 1990; Kobilova, 2007.
32 rgaspi, F. 17, Op. 159, D. 1695, L. 8.
33 garF, F. 9654, Op. 6, D. 176, L. 21-22.
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Democratic Party and Tajik branch of the Islamic Rebirth Party, were foun-
ded and became active in 1990; over the years a number of key Rastokhez 
members also joined these parties, leaving the movement behind.
The February 1990 elections to the Tajik Supreme Soviet were also 
something of a disappointment for Rastokhez. From amongst its leaders, 
only Tohir Abdudžabborov and Bozor Sobir were elected, two members of 
the small minority of non-Communists to make it into the new parliament. 
The new Supreme Soviet quickly gained a pro-government reputation, 
insofar as it was dominated not only by party members, but by those “who 
had drunk from the up of high office,” in the words of Asliddin Sohibnazar 
(1997, v. 1, p. 18), a parliament deputy and future founder of the Democratic 
Party of Tajikistan. In fact, 216 out of the 230 new Supreme Soviet depu-
ties were members of the Communist Party, the vast majority of whom had 
previously held party and government posts.34 This result has long been 
explained by Rastokhez sympathisers as the intended consequence of the 
February riots: by instigating a week of violence in Dushanbe, which was 
then blamed on Rastokhez and other opposition groups, the Communist 
Party of Tajikistan and the republican security services managed to deni-
grate and discredit the movement in the eyes of the population. In other 
words, the February events are best understood as a political move aimed 
at retaining control of the Supreme Soviet at any cost (Davlat, 2015d; 
Mirrahim, 1998, pp. 152-153; Davlatov, 2015; Karimov, 2015, pp. 14, 67).
This line of argument, however, makes two central assumptions that 
are worth verifying for their accuracy. First, it assumes that Rastokhez 
(perhaps along with other opposition groups) was popular enough 
throughout Tajikistan in February 1990 to win a significant portion or 
majority of the seats in the Tajik Supreme Soviet. Second, moreover, it 
takes as granted that the Tajik government was worried enough about the 
influence of Rastokhez in the first months of 1990 to go as far as to insti-
gate a weeklong series of riots to deny their access to power. Upon close 
scrutiny, however, evidence for both assumptions begins to seem limited. 
Sociological surveys from late 1989 and early 1990 have shown that prior 
to the February events Rastokhez in fact had very little social recognition 
in Tajikistan, and that is was only after February 1990 that most people in 
34 Statističeskij otčet o sostave Verkhovnogo Soveta, Prezidiuma, komitetov i postoânnykh 
komissij Verkhovnogo Soveta Tadžikskoj ssr, garF, F. 9654, Op. 10, D. 100, L. 227.
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the republic had even heard of the movement (Alimov & Saidov, 1991, 
p. 102). In conversation, moreover, the former head of Rastokhez’s regio-
nal office in the southern border town of Panj has admitted that political 
agitation in the regions was especially difficult for the movement.35 From 
the government’s perspective, the early concern over the direction taken by 
Ru ba Ru seems to have waned by late 1989, and by the beginning of 1990 
almost no attention was being directed towards Rastokhez. At a republican- 
level meeting held for Tajik ideological workers on “coordinating with 
independent and social organisations” in the first days of February 1990, 
for example, no mention was made of Rastokhez or any of its members.36 
Following the February 1990 events, moreover, comment has been fre-
quently made about Rastokhez’s supposed links to the Baltic “Peoples’ 
Fronts” (nardonye fronty), which were said to heighten the threat they pre-
sented in the eyes of the Soviet authorities.37 Yet this, too, is questionable: 
actual evidence for coordination or even contact between the Baltic Fronts 
and political organisations in Dushanbe is overwhelmingly dated after the 
February events, not before.38 Ultimately, given that Rastokhez’s overall 
name recognition and fame grew as the result of the February events, it 
seems difficult to affirm the claim that the February riots would have been 
seen as an effective tool for the Soviet authorities to “retain control at any 
cost.”39 That there was a clear attempt to blame Rastokhez for the riots 
35 Author’s interview with Khikmatullo Saifullozoda, Dushanbe, February 2015.
36 rgaspi, F. 17, Op. 159, D. 1709, L. 10.
37 By and large this argument seems to have been used by opponents of Rastokhez to 
demonstrate the dangers it presented (see for example Kobilova, 2007, p. 20; Sultanov, 
2014, p. 119) or its sympathisers to emphasise the supposed level of support for the 
organisation (Dudoignon, 1998; Davlatov, 2015).
38 Evidence supporting the supposed links between Rastokhez and the Baltic Fronts is limited 
to an unsourced 1990 Radio Liberty dispatch about a supposed 1988 trip by Bozor Sobir to 
the Sajudis in Lithuania (Crow, 1990), a tapped 1990 phone call from Rastokhez member 
Khalikov to a certain low-level Sajudis member (TadžikTA, 1990), and the printing of the 
Democratic Party of Tajikistan’s newspaper by the Sajudis in late 1990 (Merezhnikova, 
1990). There is no evidence that the Sajudis or any other Baltic Fronts assisted Rastokhez 
or other political parties in Tajikistan before September 1990, even as they were working 
directly with Birlik in Uzbekistan and other regional parties. For more on the Baltics’ lack 
of attention to Tajikistan, see Muiznieks, 1995; Beissinger, 2002, p. 85.
39 Since the fall of the ussr, a story has developed about the use of force against organised 
crowds and violent pogroms over the course of 1989-1990 that paints these events as an 
attempt by the centre to “discredit the opposition” and “re-establish centralised control.” 
While the use of military force in the Caucasus (Tbilisi, Baku) or Central Asia (Ferghana, 
Osh, Dushanbe) during this period may have temporarily re-established Moscow’s authority, 
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and denigrate the organisation’s reputation as a result does not necessarily 
mean – as Rastokhez members have later argued – that the entire scheme 
was premeditated (Mirrahim, 1998, pp. 152-153).
It does remain difficult to judge Rastokhez’s overall level of popular 
support prior to the February 1990 events. Some sources sympathetic to the 
movement have claimed that it “rapidly won popular support” (for example 
Dudoignon, 1998, p. 58) and that by January 1990 “hardly anyone doubted” 
Rastokhez’s victory in the upcoming elections to the Tajik Supreme Soviet 
(Davlatov, 2015). Rastokhez members, most notably Mirrahimov, have 
argued that the organisation was truly “national” (millatčī), with support 
throughout the republic (Mirrahim, 1998, p. 50). Other evidence, however, 
paints a less one-sided picture. While many people in Dushanbe seem to 
have been sympathetic to Rastokhez’s arguments in favour of economic 
independence and cultural development – one study from 1990 (Kul’čik et 
al., p. 34) estimated that the movement likely had approximately 10,000 
“sympathisers” in Dushanbe – it remained a relatively small and urban 
organisation dominated by university professors and other intelligentsia 
representatives (Olimov & Olimova, 1991, p. 101). This had been the case 
since its formation under the auspices of Ru ba Ru, where nearly 75% 
of all members were university students, teachers, or academics (Davlat, 
2015b), and it remained true for Rastokhez’s core throughout its existence. 
During protests and other times of strife, the core members of Rastokhez 
were frequently joined by masses of “students who had recently arrived 
from rural areas,” but whose concerns differed from the movement’s lea-
ders and who easily shifted political camps when it was convenient to do 
so (Kul’čik et al., 1990, p. 35). Even the supposed fame the movement 
had won by pushing through the Tajik Law on Language is in fact less 
obvious than is often presented. According to Asliddin Sohibnazar (1997, 
v. 1, pp. 14-15), the ultimate decision for the law’s passage was made in 
Moscow and had little reference to the meetings held in Dushanbe in 1989. 
Sohibnazar argues that Kahhor Mahkamov, concerned about the passage 
of similar laws elsewhere in the ussr, called Mikhail Gorbachev to discuss 
the issue in July 1989. Gorbachev advised Mahkamov to have such a law 
passed, since Tajikistan’s failure to do so might be seen as a sign of its 
in the long run, all of these acts were ultimately used by opposition and pro-independence 
movements against Moscow, making them very ineffective tools indeed if that was their 
original purpose.
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“backwardness.” Former members of Rastokhez have also noted the Law 
on Language’s lack of resonance with the general population:
We went back to our districts and people looked at us funny.
‘Why do we need this law?’ they asked – ‘we already speak in Tajik 
anyways.’40
Conclusion
While it may be challenging to determine with any accuracy Rastokhez’s 
level of popular support in 1989 and 1990, with the advantage of hindsight 
some comment can at least be made about the importance of its early poli-
tical mobilisation for the Tajik political sphere as a whole. In contrast to the 
smaller organisations that were founded in 1988 and early 1989, Rastokhez, 
through both its early incarnation as Ru ba Ru and during its later political 
lobbying, began to act as a real political force. No matter the ultimate level 
of influence its lobbying and meetings had on political decision-making in 
Dushanbe, it represented the first exclusively political organisation in the 
Tajik ssr outside of the Communist Party of Tajikistan. It was also the first 
organisation in the republic to effectively motivate and mobilise citizens to 
political action, whether this was gathering on the street in support of the 
Tajik language or writing letters to political leaders. Tajik Soviet citizens 
statistically wrote letters to the central authorities with one of the lowest 
frequencies of any republic in the Union – any letter writing at all, such as 
was recorded in and around the February events, represented some element 
of politicisation.41 This experience of political organisation would then be 
applied by many of Rastokhez’s leaders and members who would later 
join other Tajik political parties on both sides of the spectrum and help to 
foment the rapid development of parties and factions that came to quickly 
dominate Tajik politics after its declaration of full independence from the 
ussr in September 1991.
Tracking the development of Ru ba Ru and Rastokhez from February 
1989 to February 1990, moreover, provides a unique perspective from 
which to consider the political mobilisation taking place in the Tajik ssr 
during perestroika. At the beginning of 1989, economic concerns were 
40 Author’s interview with Khikmatullo Saifullozoda, Dushanbe, February 2015.
41 In 1989, for example, only 0.7% of all letters sent to the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party in Moscow had originated in the Tajik ssr (rgani, F. 100, Op. 1, D. 286, 
LL. 2-7, 177-181).
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clearly at the fore. While questions about the status of the Tajik language 
and “cultural rebirth” were given more media attention, nearly everyone 
involved in the decision to found Ru ba Ru was fundamentally worried 
about the economy. This included the future founders of Rastokhez. The 
Chairman of Rastokhez, Tohir Abdudžabborov, remained throughout 
an economist, concerned about Tajikistan’s place in the shifting Soviet 
economy.42 Even Mirrahimov, often seemingly focused on cultural and 
linguistic issues, never lost sight of the economy. Mere days before the 
February 1989 protest, he took part in an academic roundtable in Moscow, 
where he explicitly linked interethnic relations and cultural development 
in Tajikistan to the republic’s imbalanced economic relations with Moscow 
(Mirrahimov, 1989, p. 84). The leaders of the Tajik ssr were equally 
concerned, understanding, as this article has shown, that the students on the 
streets were expressing a set of largely economic concerns. Surprisingly 
few contemporary politicians or journalists bothered to ask those gathered 
on the street what their frustrations actually constituted. Those who did, 
however, frequently received answers about the lack of jobs or housing in 
the republic.43 The fragile balance of the Tajik economy, which had long 
been known for some of the lowest standards of living in the ussr, had been 
pushed over the edge by perestroika’s economic reforms, leading to higher 
unemployment, greater difficulties with housing, and in many cases, even 
lower wages for those who retained their jobs. These conditions unsurpri-
singly led to an outpouring of frustration and anger amongst the masses of 
young and either unemployed or underemployed men from Dushanbe and 
its surroundings, who made up the majority of those responding to calls to 
meet and protest against the current leadership of the Tajik ssr.
The political genius of Ru ba Ru and Rastokhez, however, was to pro-
vide a space in which the economic frustrations of perestroika in Tajikistan 
could metamorphose into a political movement with contours greater than 
the economic downturn that had caused its rise. In the meetings held under 
the auspices of Ru ba Ru, the leaders of the Tajik ssr were criticised not 
only for their economic policies – but just as much for their stances on 
cultural and national issues or their supposed opposition to change. Once 
42 For a fuller discussion of Abdudžabborov’s evolving economic views, see Kalinovsky, 
2014.
43 rgaspi, F. 17, Op. 159, D. 1710, L. 16-17; also Alimov & Saidov, 1991, pp. 95, 103.
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founded as an official movement, Rastokhez lobbied not only for eco-
nomic independence, but also against the leadership of the republic, in 
favour of the Tajik language, and against the infamous Sixth Article of the 
Soviet Constitution, which was later thrown out as an afterthought during 
Gorbachev’s election as President of the ussr during the Third Congress 
of People’s Deputies in March 1990. Economic opposition solidified into 
opposition writ large: the members of Ru ba Ru and Rastokhez began to 
see themselves as representatives of a strictly political movement, and 
one that was capable of expressing concerns that went beyond the state 
of the Tajik economy in its fight against the neocolonial rule of the ussr. 
Ultimately, Rastokhez was able to at least temporarily overcome the gap 
between the national intelligentsia in Dushanbe and the villages from 
which it had grown distant. It managed to mobilise the more rural elements 
of Tajik youth and redirect their initially economic frustrations towards its 
own cultural and political ends.44
The development of a political movement out of what seemed to be 
a series of unconnected and undirected economic concerns appears to 
have taken the leadership of the Tajik ssr by complete surprise. Mirbobo 
Mirrahimov is reported to have said that Goibnazar Pallaev, the Chairman 
of the Tajik Supreme Soviet, “could not believe it” when the movement 
first attempted to register itself in 1989; this was “like a thunderbolt” for 
him and the rest of the party heads (Šodiev & Khumajro, 2014). From the 
perspective of the Tajik Communist Party, the economic concerns of those 
protesting in the streets needed to be listened to, taken into consideration, 
and dealt with economically – for which Ru ba Ru had been called upon to 
provide an initial platform. That this platform could lead to the development 
of an independent political movement that would begin to demand more 
than just economic reforms does not seem to have been taken into consi-
44 Socially and economically, the Tajik national intelligentsia had for decades been isolated 
from the cultural life of the villages from whence its members had originally been drawn. In 
part, this was due to the long-term consequences of the early Soviet policy of korenizaciâ, 
which had in part given preference to Tajik applicants for higher education. Over time, the 
number of Tajiks with university degrees (and especially humanities degrees) increased, 
whereas the number with technical or scientific degrees decreased. Since the main area of 
employment for Tajiks with higher humanitarian degrees was at universities or other city-
based institutions, the concentration of Tajik intelligentsia in Dushanbe and other cities 
increased notably. In the villages, on the other hand, there was a clear level of “intellectual 
hunger.” This imbalance was noted with increasing frequency in the latter years of 
perestroika (Nazaršoev, 1989, p. 6; Anonymous, 1989a).
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deration. Given the events occurring across the ussr at the time, including 
the formation of national fronts in the Baltics, strikes in Russia, riots in 
neighbouring Uzbekistan, and many other similar disturbances, the lack 
of concern on the part on Mahkamov and other Tajik leaders is somewhat 
surprising. Given the history of the Tajik ssr, however, it is also unders-
tandable: up until 1989 political unrest had been simply unknown in the 
republic, and cultural and political concerns seemed the least immediate of 
citizens’ concerns. By 1989 nearly everyone in the republic – including the 
party and state leaderships – had grown focused on the state of the local 
economy and its ongoing collapse; political mobilisation seemed a far less 
immediate worry.
Under the auspices of Ru ba Ru and Rastokhez, however, the economic 
problems of perestroika became a platform for mobilisation and political 
opposition on cultural, linguistic, and nationalist grounds, which together 
set the scene for the Tajik ssr’s last two years in the Soviet Union. It remains 
important, moreover, to ground the study of this mobilisation within 
the context and base from which it arose. While recent scholarship has 
tended to focus on the role of nationalism and linguistic issues in driving 
political mobilisation in late Soviet Central Asia, the case of Ru ba Ru and 
Rastokhez help to demonstrate the underlying economic content of most 
citizens’ complaints and motivations. In line with models demonstrated 
elsewhere, disappointed economic expectations quickly came to bleed into 
broader political anger and a rejection of the political system writ large 
(Davies, 1974; Gurr, 2010; for an application to the ussr, see Češko, 1993, 
pp. 32-33). In Tajikistan, this early model of political mobilisation would 
remain significant, even as Rastokhez itself would fade in political weight 
in the years following 1990. During the final years of the ussr, other poli-
tical parties would harness the frustrations of the many increasingly out of 
work and underemployed rural workers for their own political purposes. 
Together with elements of the regional and central national intelligentsia, 
for example, these workers would also make up the core of protests held in 
August and September 1991 that led to the ouster of Kahhor Mahkamov as 
President of Tajikistan. Thus the stage was set for political struggle.
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Abstract
Over the course of the year between February 1989 and February 1990, Dushanbe 
underwent a political activisation. The capital of the Tajik ssr saw the develop-
ment of an independent and antagonistic political club, Ru ba Ru, which with 
time developed into the national movement Rastokhez. Through a detailed ana- 
lysis of Ru ba Ru and Rastokhez’s development and actions during the period of 
1989-1990, this article demonstrates the ways in which these groups were able to 
harness the Tajik Soviet citizens’ economic and social concerns and mobilise them 
into a movement for political and cultural change.
Keywords: Tajikistan, political mobilisation, perestroika, glasnost, economic re-
form, Soviet Union.
Résumé
De février à février et de Ru ba Ru à Rastokhez. Mobilisation politique au 
Tadjikistan soviétique finissant (1989-1990)
Tout au long de l’année allant de février 1989 à février 1990, Douchanbé a connu 
une période d’activisme politique. La capitale de la rss tadjike a vu se développer 
un club indépendant d’opposition politique, Ru ba Ru, qui se transforma progres-
sivement en mouvement national Rastokhez. À travers une analyse détaillée du 
développement et des actions menées par Ru ba Ru et Rastokhez sur la période, 
cet article montre la manière dont ces groupes ont été en mesure d’exploiter les 
préoccupations économiques et sociales des citoyens tadjiks soviétiques et de les 
mobiliser autour d’un mouvement pour le changement politique et culturel.
Mots clés : Tadjikistan, mobilisations politiques, perestroïka, glasnost, réformes 
économiques, Union soviétique.
171From February to February and from Ru ba Ru to Rastokhez
Аннотация
От февраля к февралю и от «Ру ба Ру» к «Растохез». Политическая 
мобилизация в Таджикистане в преддверии распада ссср (1989-1990)
Первые независимые политические движения в Таджикской сср появились 
на социальной авансцене в период c февраля 1989 по февраль 1990 
гг. Среди них особенно выделялись политический клуб «Ру ба Ру» и 
сформировавшееся на его встречах национальное движение «Растохез». 
Детально анализируя развитие и деятельность обеих организаций, данный 
очерк раскрывает процесс, в ходе которого негодования граждан Таджикской 
сср относительно экономического спада были направлены на пользу 
культурных и политических перемен.
Ключевые слова: Таджикистан, сcср, политические движения, 
экономические реформы, гласность, перестройка.
